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CHAPTER 12 
Criminal Law, Procedure, 
and Administration 
J. EDWARD COLLINS 
§12.1. Criminal responsibility and insanity. In July 1954, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
decided Durham v. United States,1 which declared that the proper test 
for criminal responsibility requires that a determination must be made 
as to whether the crime was the product of a mental disease or defect. 
The opinion thus rejected the almost universally accepted test of in-
sanity based upon the ability of the accused to differentiate between 
right and wrong, and its widely accepted corollary, the irresistible im-
pulse test. Prior to Durham, the law in the District of Columbia was 
susbtantially the same as that prevailing in Massachusetts, where both 
the rule of M'Naghten's Case2 and the "irresistible impulse" test have 
been long employed.s 
Durham enunciated no new criterion for the determination of 
legal insanity but was merely a restatement of the so-called "product 
rule" formulated and followed by the New Hampshire courts for 
over eighty years.4 Because of the general and articulate dissatisfaction 
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§12.l. 194 App. D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862 (1954). 
2 10 Cl. 8c Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (184!1). 
S In Durham it is pointed out that the rule in M'Naghten's Case was adopted in 
the District in 1882, and the irresistible impulse test in 1929. In Massachusetts both 
tests were included in the famous jury charge given by Chief Justice Shaw in Com-
monwealth v. Rogers, 7 Mete. 500 (Mass. 1844). The Massachusetts cases subse-
quent to Commonwealth v. Rogers have explained rather than deviated from the 
criterion established in that case. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 188 Mass. !l82, 74 
N.E. 9!19(1905); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 219 Mass. I, 106 N.E. 545 (1914); Com-
monwealth v. Stewart, 255 Mass. 9, 151 N.E. 74, 44 A.L.R. 579 (1926); Commonwealth 
v. Trippi, 268 Mass. 227, 167 N.E. !l54 (1929); Commonwealth v. Sheppard, !II!! 
Mass. 590, 48 N.E.2d 6!10 (194!1). 
4 State v. Jones, 50 N.H. !l69 (1871); State v. Pike, 49 N.H. !l99 (1870). There has 
been no widespread acceptance of the New Hampshire rule. To the contrary, with 
the exception of State v. Keerl, 29 Mont. 508, 75 Pac. !l62, 101 Am. St. Rep. 579 
(1904), which appears to adopt the rule (although State v. Narich, 92 Mont. 17, 9 
P.2d 477 (19!12), raises doubts as to its status in Montana), and Parsons v. State, 81 
Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 60 Am. Rep. 19!1 (1886), which speaks favorably of it, no cases 
have been found sympathetic to the New Hampshire insanity test. 
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of the medical profession with the traditional insanity tests employed in 
the courtrooms, however, and a general awareness of judges and attor-
neys that the law in this area has not been completely adequate nor 
reflective of the advances made in the medical sciences, Durham has 
been widely publicized and commented upon,5 and has resulted in a 
broad re-examination by the legal profession of the existing criteria for 
the determination of legal insanity. 
During the 1958 SURVEY year, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts was invited to follow Durham and to substitute the test therein 
enunciated for those long established in the Commonwealth. In Com-
monwealth v. Chester6 the invitation was declined and the Durham 
doctrine unequivocally rejected.7 The Court gave a number of rea-
sons for its rejection. The Durham decision has been severely criti-
cized for leaving undefined the meaning of the words "product," "dis-
ease," and "defect" and, since these are not only essential words found 
in the test but essentially the test itself, the test is basically undefined. 
The Durham doctrine has also been rejected by the American Law In-
stitute in the formulation of its Model Penal Code, has not been fol-
lowed by any other court, and has been repudiated by at least two.8 
The Court also was not convinced that Durham offers a better standard 
for the guidance of the trier of fact in the determination of the issue 
of insanity than is offered by the two older tests. 
A further cogent reason for the rejection of Durham, although not 
mentioned in the Chester case, is that the test, in practical operation, 
has not worked particularly well in the District of Columbia. Instruc-
tions given by trial judges have been approved in three instances9 and 
found to be erroneous in two cases;lO two cases have been reversed, in 
5 See, e.g., Symposium: Insanity and the Criminal Law - A Critique of Durham 
v. United States, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317 (1955); Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Re-
sponsibility, 65 Yale L.J. 761 (1956). For a pre-Durham bibliography on insanity 
as a defense to crime, see 7 Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York 158 (1952). 
61958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 995, 150 N.E.2d 914. 
7 The doctrine was not rejected, however, with the majestic disdain of the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. "This court has no desire to join the courts of 
New Hampshire and the District of Columbia in their 'magnificent isolation' of 
rebellion against M'Naghten." Andersen v. United States, 237 F.2d 118, 127 (9th 
Cir. 1956). 
8 The Court made mention of the fact that Durham had been rejected by the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Andersen, 237 F.2d 118 
(9th Cir. 1956), and by Maryland in Thomas v. State, 206 Md. 575, 112 A.2d 913 
(1954). Although not mentioned, the case was also rejected by Montana in State 
v. Kitchens, 129 Mont. 331, 286 P.2d lO79 (1955); Vermont in State v. Goyet, 120 
Vt. 12, 132 A.2d 623 (1957); and Washington in State v. Collins, 50 Wash. 2d 740, 
314 P.2d 660 (1957). Also rejecting the Durham rule without mention of the Dur-
ham decision have been California in People v. Berry, 44 Cal. 2d 426, 282 P.2d 861 
(1955); and Indiana in Flowers v. State, 236 Ind. 151, 139 N.E.2d 185 (1956). See 
also Howard v. United States, 229 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1956). 
9 Kelley v. United States, 236 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Bailey v. United States, 
248 F.2d 558 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Bradley v. United States, 249 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 
1957). 
10 Stewart v. United States, 214 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Carter v. United States, 
252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1958). 
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one for failure on the part of the trial judge to amplify correct instruc-
tionsP and in the other for failure to receive evidence relating to the 
pre-Durham right and wrong and irresistible impulse tests.12 In the 
most recent case before the appellate court a dissenting judge strongly 
urged that" ... the best way to deal with the rule which requires such 
elaborate explanation is to discard it in favor of the pre-existing rule 
. . . which did not generate so much confusion." IS 
It is unfortunate, however, that the Supreme Judicial Court in the 
Chester decision should make an extended reference to the insanity 
definition proposed by the American Law Institute in its Model Penal 
Code,14 and its favorable recommendation by the Judicial Council, 
only to dismiss this definition with the comment that no judgment 
with respect to its desirability should be made, it not having been 
properly presented in the case. One is left with the impression that 
the Court, as presently constituted, does not look unfavorably upon 
the Model Penal Code test and might, in a proper case, be persuaded 
to substitute it for the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests. At 
present the trial judges must continue to send cases to the jury based 
upon evidence and instructions relating to the traditional tests for in-
sanity used in Massachusetts since 1844. 
§12.2. Right of indigent defendant to assistance of counsel. In 
recent years, the question of the right of an indigent accused to the 
assistance of court appointed counsel has been a matter of frequent con-
cern to the courts of the Commonwealth'! During the 1958 SURVEY 
year it has been a subject of judicial cognizance, not only in criminal 
proceedings but also in the exercise by the Supreme Judicial Court of 
its rule-making powers. 
11 Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1957). 
12 Douglas v. United States, 239 F.2d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 
13 Catlin v. United States, 251 F.2d 368, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The confusion 
referred to is exemplified by the Catlin case and Douglas v. United States, 239 
F.2d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1956). In Douglas it was held that the trial court should permit 
the jury to consider the criteria of the right and wrong and irresistible impulse 
tests and testimony given in terms of these tests should not be excluded. In Catlin, 
the appellant urged that the trial court's charge was erroneous for failure to in-
clude a requested instruction to the effect that if the jury should find the accused 
was suffering from a mental disease to which the crime was attributable it should 
find him not guilty by reason of insanity, even though the jury should also find 
that he was able to distinguish right from wrong and did not act upon an irresist-
ible impulse. The appellate court disposed of this contention by finding no evi-
dence of accused's ability to distinguish right from wrong, or action under irre-
sistible impulse, thereby leaving open the question as to the validity of the 
appellant's contention as a matter of law. 
14 Section 4.01 of the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute reads: 
"(I) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct 
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks susbtantial capacity either to appre-
ciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of law. 
"(2) The terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality mani-
fested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct." 
§12.2. 1 See 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §23.2. 
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In 1957, for the first time in Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial 
Court reversed a non-capital criminal case for failure of a trial judge 
to assign counsel for an indigent defendant.2 In reaching its decision 
the Court followed the rule established by the United States Supreme 
Court,S although the defendant's right found to be violated was deemed 
to be grounded in the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Con-
stitution rather than in the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. As a result of this decision, and that in a similar case,4 
the rule has been established in this jurisdiction that, even in non-
capital felony cases in which there is an absence of any statutory pro-
vision requiring that counsel be furnished to an indigent defendant, if 
the accused, because of his youth, inexperience or incapacity, or due 
to the complexity of the legal issues, or great prejudice or disadvantage 
in standing trial unassisted by counsel, stands in the need of legal 
assistance in order to secure the fundamentals of a fair trial, a con-
viction in the absence of such assistance will be reversed as a denial of 
his right not to be deprived of his liberty "but by ... the law of the 
land." 5 
During the 1958 SURVEY year the facts of two cases were held not to 
require assignment of counsel. Commonwealth v. Hanley6 involved a 
defendant found to have been under no physical or mental disability. 
In addition, the Court found no prejudicial error of a type that the 
presence of counsel would have probably obviated. In Commonwealth 
v. Drolet 7 counsel was appointed by the trial court approximately a 
month prior to trial but was rejected by the defendant, purportedly 
because of the attorney's failure to identify himself to the satisfaction 
of the accused. More probably the accused actually rejected the as-
signed counsel because he believed the counsel specialized in civil 
rather than criminal matters. At the trial, a second request for counsel 
was made and denied. The denial was held not to be error, the de-
fendant being regarded as a person not so incapacitated as to qualify 
for counsel. There was no suggestion that the trial was other than 
fair. 
The criteria that have been established by the cases for the determi-
nation of when counsel must be made available to an indigent accused 
in a non-capital case, are not particularly difficult to understand. The 
problems arise in application of the criteria. While the trial judge 
2 Pugliese v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 471, 140 N.E.2d 476 (1957). See also 
Brown v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 476. 140 N.E.2d 461 (1957). 
B Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 Su·p. Ct. 1252, 86 L. Ed. 1595 (1942), is followed 
by a line of decisions, including Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437. 69 Sup. Ct. 
184, 93 L. Ed. 127 (1948); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 69 Sup. Ct. 1247, 93 L. Ed. 
1686 (1949); and Mass~y v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 75 Sup. Ct. 145, 99 L. Ed. 135 (1954). 
4 Brown v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 476, 140 N.E.2d 461 (1957). 
5 Mass. Const., Declaration of Rights. Art. XII. 
61958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 653,149 N.E.2d 608. 
71958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 665, 149 N.E.2d 616. See also earlier decision in the same 
case, 335 Mass. 382, 140 N.E.2d 165 (1957), commented upon in 1957 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §23.2. 
4
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may, if the matter is brought to his attention at the appropriate time, 
determine whether the accused is so incapacitated .as to need counsel, 
he may nevertheless experience great difficulty in attempting to predict 
whether a nonincapacitated defendant will receive a trial in which 
there will be no error of a type that the presence of counsel could prob-
ably obviate. In addition, as a practical matter, lack of mental capac-
ity of the accused may not become apparent until the trial is well 
under way or even, conceivably, until after the trial is ended. Simi-
larly, unfair conduct of public authorities, complexities of issues, or 
special prejudices or disadvantages to which the accused has been ex-
posed may not be disclosed until a later date. Although the trial judge 
may make the most honest and conscientious efforts to control or 
eliminate these problems, they may still arise. What the consequences 
of such developments would be is not explicitly stated in the cases, but 
there is certainly room for contending that under such circumstances 
due process will be held to be denied ab initio. 
Drolet raises an additional troublesome problem. When, as in that 
case, an accused has been assigned counsel and rejects him for reasons 
best known to himself, or for no reason at all, he is thereby deemed to 
have waived his right to legal assistance. Has he also waived any right 
he may have to a trial free from unfair conduct by public authority? 
May he be prejudiced to an extent that would be said to constitute 
a violation of the fundamentals of a fair trial if counsel had not been 
assigned originally? 
Without attempting to answer these questions which it has not been 
called upon to decide, the Supreme Judicial Court has taken a pro-
gressive step by adopting a new rule of court applicable to the Superior 
Courts. By Rule 10,8 the trial judge is required, when an unrepre-
sented defendant appears before him in a non-capital case, to advise 
the accused of his right to counsel, and to assign counsel unless the de-
fendant elects to proceed without counselor is able to secure his own 
attorney. Since by statute counsel must be assigned to an unrepre-
sented defendant in a capital case,9 the result is that now all indigent 
felony defendants may have counsel. The rule has provisions for 
waiver of counsel and contains forms appropriate therefor. 
The rule is most desirable and serves generally to conform the Mas-
sachusetts practice to that prevailing in the federal courts.1° The re-
sult of the rule will be that henceforth a great many more assignments 
of counsel will be made than has been the case in the past. Since there 
is no statutory provision for compensation for attorney'j assigned under 
the rule, as there is for those assigned in capital cases, an opportunity 
8 The text of the rule is to be found in 4~ Mass. L.Q. No.2, pp. 2-~ (1958). 
9 G.L., c. 277, §47. 
10 Fed. R. Crim. P. 44, unlike the Massachusetts rule, requires the appointment 
of counsel without distinction between the more and less serious crimes. It also 
differs in that no consent to, or certificate of, waiver need be executed by the defend-
ant or the judge respectively, although waiver of counsel is, of course, permissible 
under Rule 44. Lipscomb v. United States, 209 F.2d 8~1 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. 
denied, 347 U.S. 962 (1954). 
I 
I 
j 
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is presented to the legal profession to perform a real public service. 
Perhaps it would not be amiss to suggest that the Supreme Judicial 
Court keep a supervisory eye on the manner in which assignments are 
made and carried out to assure itself that each indigent so represented 
receives the benefit of reasonably competent and conscientious counsel. 
§12.3. Right of persons arrested for misdemeanor to use telephone. 
Both the Massachusetts1 and United States Constitutions2 guarantee to 
every arrested person the right to be represented during trial by coun-
sel of his own choosing. It is doubtful, however, that an arrested 
person has any constitutional right to the assistance of counsel prior to 
trial. One case has stated that "[t]here is nothing in the statutes of 
Massachusetts giving a person accused of a capital crime or any other 
crime a right to counsel before being brought into court." 3 The 
Court, therefore, held that the police may, during the period of arrest 
prior to trial, secure a confession which will not be inadmissible at the 
trial because the arrested person was not advised, prior to its procure-
ment, that he could secure counsel. 
In a very limited area, however, a semblance of a pre-trial right to 
legal assistance has been recognized. Since 1945 the police officer in 
charge of the station in which a person arrested for a misdemeanor is 
held in custody, is obligated to permit the arrestee to use a telephone 
to communicate with his family or friends or to engage the services of 
an attorney.4 In 1946 the law was amended to require the arrestee to 
bear the expense of the call,1I and during the 1958 SURVEY year it was 
again amended to provide that the arrestee not only be informed of 
his right to use the telephone immediately upon being booked, but in 
addition that he be permitted its use within one hour thereafter.6 
The statute is puzzling. On three occasions it has been considered 
by the legislature and yet its scope continues to be confined to persons 
arrested for misdemeanors. While many persons arrested and charged 
with misdemeanors have no particular need for legal assistance, the 
same cannot generally be said for those arrested for the more serious 
crimes. The individuals having the lesser need for legal counsel are 
the ones to whom the right has been given. 
The most recent amendment would also appear to indicate that 
arresting officers have not been overly conscientious in complying with 
the statute. Even now no sanction exists for failure to abide by it, 
save the distinctly questionable liability in a civil action for false im-
prisonment. The existence of legislation such as this serves to focus 
attention on the extreme need in the Commonwealth of a law revision 
§12.3. 1" ... And every subject shall have a right ... to be fully heard in his 
defense by himself, or his counsel, at his election." Mass. Const., Declaration of 
Rights, Art. XII. 
2 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const., Amend. V. 
8 Commonwealth v. McNeil, 328 Mass. 436, 438.104 N.E.2d 153. 155 (1952). 
4 Now found in G.L., c. 276, §33A. 
5 Acts of 1946, c. 277. 
6 Acts of 1958. c. 111l. 
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commission to assist the General Court in the enactment of laws in-
telligently conceived and formulated. 
§12.4. Effect of avoidance of sentence on consecutive sentence. 
Occasionally a case is presented to an appellate court in which the 
alternatives involve either following established legal principles to 
reach a result which, in the judgment of the court, would be unjust, or 
of following the conscience of the court and allowing the legal princi-
ples to fall where they may. When the latter course is pursued, the de-
cision is generally dismissed as one of those hard cases that make bad 
law. Somewhat rarer is the case wherein the alternatives are not jus-
tice versus principles, but rather principles versus the establishment of 
a precedent which if followed in future cases of this nature will lead 
to consequences other than just. 
The 1957 ANNUAL SURVEY commented on the case of Brown v. Com-
monwealth,l in which a conviction was set aside almost five years after 
the defendant had been sentenced to a minimum term of five years.2 
The sequel appears during the current SURVEY year in Brown v. Com-
missioner of Correction.S 
The decision is hard to justify. No injustice would have been suf-
fered by Brown if his contention had been rejected. The original 
Middlesex indictments were for armed robbery and assault and battery 
with a dangerous weapon arising out of three taxicab operator rob-
beries. His conviction for these offenses was reversed not because of 
lack of guilt but because he was not represented by counsel during the 
trial. His lack of innocence of the crimes charged is apparent from his 
subsequent plea of guilty. In paroling him the trial judge took into 
account, as is acknowledged in the decision, the time he served under 
the original indictments. Despite this, the Supreme Judicial Court, 
by directing that the time served shall be applicable to the Suffolk in-
dictments, in effect says that Brown shall, for the two separate series 
of crimes he committed, be charged only for the price of one. 
The Court discussed in its decision two motivating considerations. 
The first is that a person who has served time under a sentence that 
has been reversed should have the right to insist that consideration be 
given to this fact upon his subsequent conviction on retrial or guilty 
plea. This is believed to be a sound and just proposition. The appli-
cation of the proposition in this case, however, gives very unfortunate 
results. 
The second factor discussed in the decision is that the rule sought 
by the criminal defendant is supported by two recent federal cases that 
represent the better view. An analysis of the cases regrettably shows 
them to be inapposite. In Youst v. United States4 the defendant was 
convicted on two counts of an indictment for conspiracy to violate the 
Mann Act, and shortly thereafter he was convicted for violation of the 
§12.4. 1355 Mass. 476, 140 N.E.2d 461 (1957). 
21957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §23.2. 
S 336 Mass. 718, 147 N.E.2d 782 (1958). 
4 151 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1945). 
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act itself. Under each count of the first indictment consecutive sen-
tences of two years were imposed, and under the second indictment 
defendant was sentenced to two terms of two years each, these sentences 
to commence upon the termination of those under the first conviction. 
On appeal of the initial conviction some four years later, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found there was only one conspiracy, and 
the sentence on the second conspiracy count being illegal, null and 
void, the defendant had the right to insist that the aggregate of the 
several sentences be reduced from eight to six years and the time served 
applied to the legal sentence. 
In the second case, Ekberg v. United States,5 the defendant was con-
victed under a three count indictment, and received a separate sen-
tence of three years on each count, the terms to be concurrent. On 
appeal the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found the first count 
did not charge an offense so the time served under the sentence on that 
count became legally referable to the concurrent sentences on the other 
two counts. 
In both cases there were defects in indictments and no retrials were 
necessary to determine guilt. In both cases the defendants had re-
ceived double punishments for a single crime. In the Brown case, on 
the contrary, no double punishment was ever imposed and when the 
dust settled the defendant received only a single punishment for two 
series of crimes. On occasion cases which strive for an abstract prin-
ciple of justice reach other than just results.6 
5167 F.2d 380 (1st Cir. 1948). 
6 Brushed lightly aside by the Court as dicta is the language of Chief Justice Shaw 
in Kite v. Commonwealth, 11 Metc. 581, 585 (Mass. 1846): "The court are all of 
opinion that it is no error in a judgment, in a criminal case, to make one term of 
imprisonment commence when another terminates. If the previous sentence is 
shortened by a reversal of the judgment ... it then expires; and then, by its terms, 
the sentence in question takes effect, as if the previous one had expired by lapse of 
time. Nor will it make any difference that the previous judgment is reversed for 
error. It is voidable only, and not void; and, until reversed by a judgment, it is 
to be deemed of full force and effect; and though erroneous and subsequently re-
versed on error, it is quite sufficient to fix the term at which another sentence will 
take effect." Following the Kite decision as "the leading case upon the subject" the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has reached a conclusion contrary to the Brown 
case in Smith v. Lovell, 146 Me. 63, 77 A.2d 575 (1950). Also citing and following 
the Kite case is the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth ex reI. Holly 
v. Claudy, 171 Pa. Super. 340, 90 A.2d 253 (1952). Both the Smith and Holly cases 
were considered by the Supreme Judicial Court in reaching its decision in Brown v. 
Commissioner. 
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